Perfect Equilibria in Sequential Bargaining Games with Nonlinear Utility Functions
研究了买卖双方在非线性效用函数和贴现率影响下，通过序贯博弈进行价格谈判的完美均衡，发现当贴现率趋近零且比值等于一时，均衡价格对应纳什讨价还价解。
Bargaining over a price between a seller and a buyer is analyzed as a noncooperative sequential game. The perfect equilibrium of the game depends on the shape of the players' utility functions, which may be nonlinear. It also depends on the discount rates of the two players. If discount rates approach zero and the ratio between them equals one, the equilibrium price will correspond to the Nash bargaining solution. A bargaining game with a finite number of potential bargaining periods is also studied. The equilibrium price approaches the Nash bargaining price when the number of potential periods becomes large.