Antitrust and the New Industrial Economics
评估产业经济学最新理论对美国反垄断政策的影响，指出其对个案分析贡献大，但对救济措施和一般法律规则制定作用有限。
My assignment here is to assess the implications of recent theoretical work in industrial economics for antitrust in the United States. I don't have space enough to present a comprehensive survey of that work, nor even to catalog all recent developments with apparent antitrust implications. I attempt instead to describe the general character of those implications, limiting myself to a few illustrative specifics. Industrial economics affects antitrust policy in three different ways. First, it is used in positive analysis aimed at determining whether or not current law has been violated in specific cases and at assessing damages due injured parties. Second, it should be used in evaluating the desirability of relief that might be imposed in particular cases in order to alter structure or conduct if a violation is found. Finally, the tools and results of industrial economics are important inputs in the formulation of general rules of law. I argue here that the new industrial economics can contribute a lot to the positive analysis of individual cases, but it has much less to say about the desirability of particular relief or of general rules of law. A final section briefly examines some implications of this situation.