The Effects of Guidance Frequency and Guidance Goal on Managerial Decisions
通过实验研究了指导频率（频繁与不频繁）和指导目标（准确性、达到/超越、真实性）对管理者经营决策的影响，发现频繁指导者会牺牲总收益以换取季度盈余的可预测性，且不频繁时准确性目标也会导致类似问题。
ABSTRACT We conduct an experiment to examine the effects of guidance frequency (frequent vs. infrequent) and guidance goal (accuracy vs. meet/beat vs. truthful) on managers’ operating decisions. We find that frequent guiders sacrifice total earnings for quarterly earnings predictability irrespective of their guidance goals. Furthermore, when guidance is infrequent, guiders with accuracy goals opt for quarterly earnings predictability over total earnings more often than do guiders with either meet/beat goals or truthful goals. These findings have implications for regulators and investors in terms of the unintended consequences of requesting frequent earnings guidance. Further, while managers may perceive that accuracy goals can help their firms establish forecasting and reporting reputations, we show that accuracy goals may result in dysfunctional internal managerial decisions, particularly when guidance is issued infrequently.