The Allocation of Scientific Talent*
研究了企业通过建立实验室和雇佣研究人员来生产新知识的模型，发现研究人员在企业间的配置可能因边际收益递减速度而有效率或无效率，且当企业主要为了提升吸收能力而投资研发时，配置更可能无效率。
Abstract I consider a model in which firms produce new knowledge by building laboratories and hiring researchers in a competitive market. I show that, for a given distribution of laboratories, the allocation of researchers to firms can be efficient or inefficient, depending on how fast the firms’ marginal return on the knowledge produced decreases with the amount of knowledge produced. I then argue that the allocation of researchers to laboratories is likely to be inefficient if firms invest in research and development primarily to increase their absorptive capacity (i.e., their ability to use the stock of publicly available knowledge). When the distribution of laboratories is endogenous, a second source of inefficiency arises: firms’ underinvestment in laboratories. Policies subsidizing investment in laboratories are ineffective at restoring the first best, unless policies aimed at reallocating researchers to firms are also put in place.