The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes
构建了一个工会合同谈判模型，分析工会选择罢工或继续工作的威胁决策，并用1970-1989年美国数据检验了失业率和实际工资下降对罢工发生率的影响。
We present a bargaining model of union contract negotiations, in which the union decides between two threats: the union can strike or continue to work under the expired contract. The model makes predictions about the level of dispute activity and the form the disputes take. Strike incidence increases as the strike threat becomes more attractive, because of low unemployment or a real wage drop during the prior contract. We test these predictions by estimating logistic models of dispute incidence and dispute composition for U.S. labor contract negotiations from 1970 to 1989. We find empirical support for the model's key predictions, but these associations are weaker after 1981. In union contract negotiations in the U.S. and other countries, the union has two options if an agreement has not been reached by the contract expiration date. The union can strike or it can continue to work under the terms of the expired contract, which we call holdout. We present a strategic model of wage bargaining based on Cramton and Tracy (1992) that includes this threat decision.