GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC SUBSTITUTES
研究了不完全信息下具有战略替代性的全局博弈，证明在支付不对称时，随着信息趋于完全，全局博弈方法能选出唯一均衡，并刻画了均衡特征。
Abstract We study global games with strategic substitutes. Specifically, for a class of binary‐action, ‐player games with strategic substitutes, we prove that under payoff asymmetry, as incomplete information vanishes, the global games approach selects a unique equilibrium. We characterize this equilibrium profile ; players employ switching strategies at different cutoff signals, the order of which is directly determined by payoff asymmetry. We provide examples that illustrate our result and its connection with dominance solvability. We extend the global game literature, which has thus far been developed for games with strategic complementarities, to new applications in industrial organization, collective action problems, finance, etc .