Mechanism Design With Renegotiation and Costly Messages
研究了当机制或合同可以在事后重新谈判时，通过引入发送消息的小成本（如参加听证的时间成本），可以消除重新谈判对可实施结果函数的限制，实现任何帕累托有效的有界社会选择函数。
According to standard theory, the set of implementable outcome functions is reduced if the mechanism or contract can be renegotiated ex post.In some cases contracts can achieve nothing and so, for example, the holdup problem may be severe.This paper shows that if the mechanism is designed in such a way that sending a message involves a small cost (e.g., the opportunity cost of time spent attending a hearing) then ex post renegotiation essentially does not restrict the set of implementable functions.Any Pareto-efficient, bounded social choice function can be implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium, for any strictly positive message cost.