Strongly Consistent Self-Confirming Equilibrium
指出Fudenberg和Levine关于自我确认均衡的定理4存在反例，并提出更强的一致性概念（强一致性）来修正该定理，确保在观察到偏离者的博弈中结论仍然成立。
Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) introduced the notion of self-confirming equilibrium, which is generally less restrictive than Nash equilibrium. Fudenberg and Levine also defined a concept of consistency, and claimed in their Theorem 4 that with consistency and other conditions on beliefs, a self-confirming equilibrium has a Nash equilibrium outcome. We provide a counterexample that disproves Theorem 4 and prove an alternative by replacing consistency with a more restrictive concept, which we call strong consistency. In games with observed deviators, self-confirming equilibria are strongly consistent self-confirming equilibria. Hence, our alternative theorem ensures that despite the counterexample, the corollary of Theorem 4 is still valid. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.