Collusion or Competition? Interfirm Relationships in the Chinese Auto Industry
研究中国乘用车行业的企业间关系是否导致价格合谋，基于非嵌套假设检验方法分析数据，发现行业呈现伯特兰-纳什竞争，无合谋证据，并模拟了集团内企业合并的影响。
The C hinese passenger‐vehicle industry contains a large number of manufacturers. Some of them are members of big corporate groups centered around state owned enterprises. These corporate relationships may facilitate collusion. This paper applies the non‐nested hypothesis test methodology to data on passenger vehicles to identify whether price collusion exists within corporate groups or across groups. Our empirical results support the assumption of Bertrand Nash competition in the C hinese passenger‐vehicle industry: We find no evidence for within or cross‐group price collusion. Our policy experiments show that indigenous brands will gain market shares and profits if within‐group companies merge.