On Non-Convex Costs and Dynamic Consistency in an Exhaustible-Resource Market
研究了在不可再生资源市场中，当企业开采成本呈U形时，非合作跨期均衡的性质，发现即使市场完全可竞争，资源总量限制也会导致战略互动，质疑了可竞争市场理论的稳健性。
Noncooperative intertemporal equilibrium in an exhaustible-resource market where firms' extraction costs are u-shaped is analyzed under the hypotheses of contestability theory. If there are two or more firms, each with an identical deposit, then limitations on the total resource stock imply strategic interaction even where there is perfect contestability. These results raise questions about the robustness of properties claimed for contestable markets, as well as about the realism of expecting that equilibrium may be established in this type of market. Copyright 1991 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.