First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics
研究发现英国央行货币政策委员会成员随着经验增加倾向于选择更低利率，并排除私人信息信心增强或学习宏观经济结构等解释，提出选民向观察者传递鹰派信号的模型更符合数据，表明政策动机的声誉建设对解释专家政策选择动态很重要。
We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasing confidence in private information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal their hawkishness to observers better fits the data. The motivation for signalling is consistent with wanting to control inflation expectations, but not career concerns or pleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of capture by industry. The paper suggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be important for explaining dynamics in experts' policy choices.