Wage Indexation and the Time Consistency of Government Policy
研究了工资指数化如何帮助经济实现原本时间不一致的结果，发现弱势政策制定者更可能选择工资指数化，选民可能选择更关心失业但通过指数化承诺低通胀的政策制定者。
This paper concerns the role of wage indexation as a mechanism for enabling an economy to achieve outcomes that would not otherwise be time consistent. The desirability of indexation depends on the size of real and nominal shocks and on a policymaker's incentives for short-run inflation surprises. Policymakers' incentives to utilize wage indexation are examined and it is found that 'weak' policymakers are more likely to choose wage indexation. Hence, in an electoral equilibrium, voters may choose a policymaker who cares more about unemployment than inflation but who chooses wage indexation to commit to low inflation. Copyright 1995 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.