Block Premia, Litigation Risk, and Shareholder Protection
研究发现目标公司的诉讼风险显著影响控制权溢价，收购方预期到潜在诉讼时会降低大宗交易溢价，而法律对股东的保护则能抑制股东侵占，促使买方支付更高溢价。
Abstract Blocks of shares are typically traded at a premium for the buyer. The academic literature shows that anticipated private benefits are the main determinant of this premium rather than the projected value of future synergies. The results of this study indicate that a target's litigation risk has a significant impact on the control premium. Acquirers tend to lower block premia significantly in anticipation of potential litigation related to financial disclosure or the target's market value. Legal shareholder protection also plays a significant role in countering shareholder expropriation. Block buyers pay higher premia to acquire targets that operate in protective legal environments .