Oligopoly and the incentive for horizontal merger
用线性边际成本和线性需求模型，分析寡头市场中企业是否有激励进行横向兼并，发现兼并会提高均衡价格，但兼并后企业产量下降，兼并盈利性取决于结构和行为参数。
In order to talk about merger, one needs some \nnotion of assets or capital which can be combined, and one \nmust allow for asymmetry in the equilibrium to reflect such. \nUsing a simple notion of capital with linear marginal cost \nand linear demand, we show in two types of models when there \nis and when there is not an incentive to merge. Merger \nresults in an increase in the equilibrium price to the \nbenefit of all firms. However, this price increase arises \nprimarily because the output of the merged firm is lower \nafter the merger than the combined output of its partners \nprior to merger. We show how the profitability of merger \ndepends upon both the structural and behavioral parameters \nof the model.