Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking
分析异质性辖区间存在溢出效应（如二氧化碳排放）时，分权政策制定如何能在没有上级干预或科斯谈判的情况下实现全球效率，对研究环境联邦主义和资本税竞争的学者有参考价值。
We analyze models with interjurisdictional spillovers among heterogeneous jurisdictions, such as CO 2 emissions that affect the global environment. Each jurisdiction's emissions depend upon the local stock of capital, which is inter-jurisdictionally mobile and subject to local taxation. In important cases, decentralized policymaking leads to efficient resource allocation, even in the complete absence of corrective interventions by higher-level governments or coordination of policy through Coasian bargaining. In particular, even when the preferences and production technologies differ among the agents, the decentralized system can result in globally efficient allocation.