Irrigation Districts and Water Markets: An Application of Cooperative Decision-Making Theory
运用合作与俱乐部理论模型，分析美国西部供水组织对城乡水权转移的反应，发现内部冲突可能阻碍有利的水交易，产权界定不清是冲突根源。
Water supply organizations control a large portion of agricultural water rights in the western U.S. This paper applies cooperative and club theory models to analyze the response of these organizations to potential rural-to-urban water transfers. Application of the models is to a proposed water trade between Southern California's Imperial Irrigation District and Metropolitan Water District. The analysis reveals that substantial intraorganizational conflict can emerge in response to specific transfer proposals, and this conflict may be sufficient to defeat or delay otherwise beneficial transfers. Poorly defined property rights and a failure to align these rights with operational control in the water supply organization are pinpointed as key sources of conflict.