Optimum Forest Rotation in an Imperfect Stumpage Market
研究了当森林所有者面临向下倾斜的需求曲线（即垄断市场）时，最优轮伐期如何不同于完全竞争市场下的经典Faustmann解，并指出社会最优轮伐期介于垄断者最优与原子式所有者最优之间。
After being ignored for a century, Martin Faustmann received some rightly deserved attention by economists when Gaffney (1960) studied the question of forest rotations and showed that maximization of present net worth as suggested by him (Faustmann 1849) was perhaps the best economic criterion for timber management. Later works by Bentley and Teeguarden (1965), Naslund (1969), Plourde (1970), Schreuder (1971), Anderson (1976), and Clark (1976) generally confirm Faustmann's views. While Pearse (1967) simplified the findings of Gaffney he treated time as a factor of production and showed the optimum rotation to be that length of time for which marginal costs equaled marginal returns. Most authors who have supported Faustmann's proposition have either explicitly (see Anderson 1976) or implicitly assumed the existence of a purely competitive stumpage market. As far as we are aware, there has been no discussion on optimal rotation in a context where this assumption does not hold. Forest economists would like forest managers to maximize the present net worth of their enterprises because they have generally analysed the problem from the point of view of an owner of a relatively small forest area (atomistic owner) and thus expect the invisible hand to operate. However, for large forest owners (for example, Canadian provincial governments), who presumably face a downward sloping demand curve for stumpage, maximization of soil expectation value results in a rotation that is shorter than the socially optimal rotation. This paper endeavors to show the effects of monopolistic forest ownership on the optimal rotation and demonstrates that the socially desirable rotation in a monopolistic situation is longer than that which maximizes the monopolist's present worth, but is shorter than the atomistic rotation that is usually seen as the optimal economic rotation by foresters.