Read My Lips, Watch for Leaps: Preference Equilibrium and Political Instability
研究选民偏好如何随政策调整而演变，导致政治不稳定，并指出机会主义政客为连任会违背竞选承诺，实施能适应未来偏好的政策。
As norms and tastes adapt to the social conditions shaped by policy variables, voters ’ opinions about these policies may evolve as well. We show how this process can lead to political instability. Moreover, if a politician’s platform is shaped opportunistically so as to gain the majority’s support, once in office the politician should not implement the promised policy in order to remain popular and get re-elected. Rather, the effective policy in this respect is the one which will be deemed optimal by most voters after the norms and opinions will adjust to that very policy. Political instability is an inherent part of the democratic system. We are no longer surprised by a frequent change of elected leaders, nor by leaders not keeping up their campaign promises. At the same time we are also not surprised by frequent shifts in public opinion and the changing popularity of different policies or different politicians. Adopting the paradigm of stable preferences and rational behaviour, the question is what are the sources of such instability? One obvious possibility is that different exogenous events, like war or economic cycles, affect voting patterns or