Exit expectations and debt crises in currency unions
研究了货币联盟成员国的退出预期如何加剧主权债务危机，通过一个小型开放经济模型区分退出预期与直接违约预期，并用希腊数据量化了2009-2012年危机中退出预期的作用。
Membership in a currency union is not irreversible. Exit expectations may emerge during sovereign debt crises, because exit allows countries to reduce their liabilities through a currency redenomination. As market participants anticipate this possibility, sovereign debt crises intensify. We establish this formally within a small open economy model of changing policy regimes. The model permits explosive dynamics of debt and sovereign yields inside currency unions and allows us to distinguish between exit expectations and those of an outright default. By estimating the model on Greek data, we quantify the contribution of exit expectations to the crisis dynamics during 2009-2012.