Voluntary Disclosures, Corporate Control, and Investment
研究了当管理者拥有投资机会的私人信息且公司控制市场有效时，自愿披露在估值和资本配置中的作用，发现均衡披露呈双尾特征，且坏消息的市场反应强于好消息。
ABSTRACT We examine the valuation and capital allocation roles of voluntary disclosure when managers have private information regarding the firm’s investment opportunities, but an efficient market for corporate control influences their investment decisions. For managers with long‐term stakes in the firm, the equilibrium disclosure region is two‐tailed: only extreme good news and extreme bad news is disclosed in equilibrium. Moreover, the market’s stock price and investment responses to bad news disclosures are stronger than the responses to good news disclosures, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. We also find that myopic managers are more likely to withhold bad news in good economic times when markets can independently assess expected investment returns.