Corporate Governance, Political Connections, and Intra‐Industry Effects: Evidence from Corporate Scandals in China
研究中国公司丑闻在行业内的溢出效应，发现同行公司良好的公司治理能减少丑闻的传染，外部治理对财务和非财务丑闻的传染都有较强抑制作用，国有产权有助于缓解非财务丑闻对民营企业的负面影响。
This paper investigates intra‐industry spillover effects of corporate scandals in China. We demonstrate how a contagion effect spreads to peer firms depending upon the quality of corporate governance and their political connections. Good corporate governance in peer firms reduces the contagion effect of scandals. External governance has a stronger influence on reducing the contagion effect of both financial and non‐financial scandals, while ownership concentration and the quality of auditors play a more pronounced role in mitigating the contagion effect of financial scandals. State ownership helps to mitigate the negative influence of non‐financial scandals in individual‐owned firms, but not in state‐owned enterprises.