Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal–Agent Relations
通过实验室实验研究主观绩效评价下的互惠行为，发现代理人会在委托人给予低于自我评价的反馈时进行制裁，而委托人则会在不影响自身收益时给予更积极的反馈。
Abstract We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on, and principals benefiting from, a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents, and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity, we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self‐evaluations even if agents' pay‐offs are independent of it. In turn, principals provide more positive feedback (relative to their actual performance assessment of the agent) if this does not affect their pay‐off.