Audit Report Restrictions in Debt Covenants
研究了债务契约中限制借款人获得持续经营审计意见的条款，发现信用质量越低、贷款期限越长，越可能包含该条款，且此类条款会导致审计费用上升和更可能收到持续经营审计意见。
Abstract While the debt‐contracting literature has extensively examined financial covenants, there has been little attention paid to audit‐related covenants. We focus on a covenant that restricts the borrower from receiving a going‐concern audit report ( GCAR covenant). We hypothesize that a debt agreement is more likely to include a GCAR covenant as the borrower's credit quality decreases and the length of the loan period increases, and that it is more likely to impose a covenant restricting the choice of auditor when the debt includes a GCAR covenant. Also, we expect that an audit client with a GCAR covenant will be charged a higher audit fee and is more likely to receive a going‐concern audit report. We test these hypotheses on a sample of firms that issue private debt. Our results generally support our hypotheses. Our study suggests that lenders rely on the auditor's assessment in contracting, and audit‐related covenants influence auditor behavior.