Political Connections, Financing Friction, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from Chinese Listed Family Firms
研究2000-2007年中国家族企业投资行为，发现信息不对称导致的投资不足普遍存在，而政治关联能缓解这一问题，尤其对融资受限企业效果更明显。
Abstract Using a sample of Chinese family firms from 2000 to 2007, we investigate the investment behaviour of family firms and the effects of these firms’ political connectedness on their investments in a relationship‐based economy. Consistent with previous evidence that Chinese family firms have difficulty in financing, our results demonstrate that underinvestment due to problems with asymmetric information rather than overinvestment resulting from problems of free cash flow prevails in such firms. We further find that the political connectedness of family firms can help mitigate the underinvestment problem, with the mitigation effect being more pronounced in financially constrained firms .