The Rise and Persistence of Rigidities
论证就业保护立法更可能出现在在职者租金较高的经济体中，解释了为何实际工资刚性更强的经济体也有更强的就业保护，并指出刚性会因低生产率部门工人的反对而持续存在。
In this paper we argue that employment protection legislation is more likely to arise when the rents earned by the employed over their alternative wage is greater. The model explains why economies with greater real wage rigidity also have greater employment protection. The model also predicts that lower turnover increases the political support for employment protection and that this political support is greater when employment protection is more harmful for employment. Also, rigidities are persistent as they create a constituency of low-productivity sectors whose workers would oppose the removal of firing costs, even though existing rents would not generate support for introducing them. We argue that tight labour markets due to post-war reconstruction needs in Europe made it easier for insiders to create such rents, which in turn led them to support employment protection legislation. In the late 1970s, rents started to fall but reforms proved difficult because of ratchet effects.