Switching Costs in Two‐Sided Markets
研究了动态双边市场中转换成本与网络效应的相互作用，发现转换成本会加剧首期价格竞争，且一侧转换成本上升会降低另一侧首期价格，忽视这些效应可能高估转换成本对福利的损害。
Abstract In many markets, there are switching costs and network effects. Yet the literature generally deals with them separately. This paper bridges the gap by analyzing their interaction (or ‘indirect bargain’) in a dynamic two‐sided market. It shows that in the symmetric equilibrium, the classic result that the first‐period price is U‐shaped in switching costs does not emerge, but instead switching costs always intensify the first‐period price competition. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first‐period price on the other side. Policies that ignore these effects may overestimate the extent to which switching costs can reduce welfare.