The Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price
综述了企业认识到质量依赖于价格（如生产率依赖于工资、违约概率依赖于利率）并利用价格控制来增加利润的文献，总结了这一现象对竞争均衡理论的重要影响，包括供求定律失效、单一价格定律失效、歧视性均衡存在、比较静态后果及市场均衡无效率。
This paper is concerned with situations where firms not only recognize the dependence of quality on price (of productivity on wages, of default probability on the interest rate charged), but also attempt to use what control they have over price (wages, interest rates) to increase their profits. The recognition of this possibility has important implications for economic theory, which have recently been explored in a large number of papers in several disparate fields. The objective of this paper is to survey these papers and to draw out the central themes of this literature. This paper is divided into four parts, In Part I, we discuss the most important implications of the dependence of quality on price for competitive equilibrium theory--the repeal of the law of supply and demand (Part I.1), the repeal of the law of the single price (Part I.2), the existence of discriminatory equilibria (Part I.3), the comparative static consequences (Part I.4), and the inefficiency of market equilibria (Part I.5). Part II discusses alternative explanations for the dependence of quality on price in labor, capital, and product markets.