Interlocked Village Markets and Trader Idiosyncrasy in Rural India
利用印度村庄商品市场的交易数据，研究发现一价定律失效和交易者特质性现象，即大量商品卖给出价并非最高的交易者，计量分析表明互惠动机是主因，导致市场低效和意外供给反应。
The role of traders and traditional exchange institutions has received little attention in empirical research on rural markets in developing countries. We use detailed data on transactions in a village commodity market in India and identify two observed anomalies: first, the repeal of the law of one price, and second, a trader-idiosyncratic effect, namely that large volumes are sold to a trader who does not offer the best price. Econometric analysis demonstrates that trader idiosyncrasy can largely be explained by reciprocity motives in interlocked village markets. Reciprocity leads to market inefficiencies and can result in unexpected supply responses.