POSITIONAL CONCERNS IN AN OLG MODEL: OPTIMAL LABOR AND CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION*
研究在信息不对称的两类型代际交叠模型中，当个体关注相对消费时，地位关注如何通过两个渠道影响最优劳动和资本收入税政策，并发现与常规模型相比，边际劳动所得税率显著提高，低能力者的边际资本所得税率绝对值显著降低。
This article concerns optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in a two‐type OLG model when individuals’ relative consumption matters. Positional concerns affect the policy choices via two channels: (i) the average degree of positionality and (ii) positionality differences between the low‐ability type and the mimicker. Under plausible empirical estimates, the marginal labor income tax rates become substantially larger, and the absolute value of the marginal capital income tax rate of the low‐ability type becomes substantially smaller, than in the conventional model. In addition to measures of reference consumption based on average consumption, we also address within‐generation and upward comparisons.