Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism in Japan: A Test of Management Entrenchment Effect
研究了日本企业中管理者持股比例对会计稳健性的影响，发现低持股和高持股时负相关（激励一致效应），中间持股时正相关（管理者堑壕效应），表明会计稳健性有助于缓解管理者与股东间的代理问题。
Abstract: We examine the effect of managerial ownership on the demand for accounting conservatism in Japan. We find that within the low and high levels of managerial ownership, managerial ownership is significantly negatively related to the asymmetric timeliness of earnings, which is consistent with the implication of the incentive alignment effect. We also find a significant positive relationship between managerial ownership and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings for the intermediate levels of managerial ownership, as suggested by the management entrenchment effect. These evidences suggest the possibility that accounting conservatism contributes to addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders.