Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice
研究了概率社会选择中两个基本公理（可变选民一致性和相似选项成分一致性）的兼容性，发现它们唯一刻画了Fishburn提出的极大抽签函数，该函数对应多数博弈的最优混合策略，可通过线性规划高效计算。
Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect to a variable electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar alternatives. In the context of traditional non-probabilistic social choice, these axioms are incompatible with each other. We show that in the context of probabilistic social choice, these axioms uniquely characterize a function proposed by Fishburn (Rev. Econ. Stud., 51(4), 683--692, 1984). Fishburn's function returns so-called maximal lotteries, i.e., lotteries that correspond to optimal mixed strategies of the underlying plurality game. Maximal lotteries are guaranteed to exist due to von Neumann's Minimax Theorem, are almost always unique, and can be efficiently computed using linear programming.