Time Consistent Public Expenditures
研究政府无法承诺未来政策时，公共支出的最优选择，利用马尔可夫均衡分析资本存量作为状态变量的动态博弈，推导出广义欧拉方程。
In this paper, we study the optimal choice of public expenditures when there is no way of committing to future policy and "reputational" mechanisms are not operative. This amounts to confining our attention to Markov equilibria. The environment is a neoclassical growth model where consumers derive utility from a public good. This environment gives rise to a dynamic game between successive governments and the private sector and this game is made interesting by the presence of a state variable: the capital stock. We characterize equilibria in terms of an intertemporal first--order condition (a "generalized Euler equation", GEE) for the government and we use this condition both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computation. The GEE