HORIZONTAL MERGERS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONSUMER WELFARE IN A COURNOT OLIGOPOLY WITH ASSETS*
研究了竞争监管机构要求企业剥离资产以批准合并时，在没有技术协同效应的情况下，即使采取结构性补救措施，合并也极不可能使消费者受益。
Competition authorities sometimes require that firms divest some of their assets to rivals in order to allow a merger to take place. This paper extends the results of Farrell and Shapiro [1990a] and shows that, in the absence of technological synergies, a merger is highly unlikely to benefit consumers, even if it is subjected to appropriate structural remedies. For instance, a merger may ultimately lead to a lower price only if at least two different firms acquire the divested assets, and if the merging parties had relatively important pre‐merger market shares.