Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information
分析了一个双边不完全信息下的诉讼与和解博弈模型，刻画了序贯均衡集，给出了有效均衡存在的条件，并探讨了精炼测试对有效均衡的排除以及私人信息质量的比较静态分析。
This paper deals with a simple game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information. Parties are assumed to have the choice between settling their dispute out of court or resorting to costly litigation. The set of sequential equilibria is characterized and conditions are given under which an efficient equilibrium does exist. Efficient equilibria, however, will be ruled out by various tests of refinement. A comparative statics analysis is carried out with respect to the quality of private information which parties are assumed to receive before any moves have to be made.