Informal Care and the Division of End-of-Life Transfers
利用AHEAD数据研究未婚父母临终时如何分配遗产以补偿提供非正式照料的子女，发现遗产分配会偏向当前和预期的照料者，且子女的照料决策受资源约束但具有利他性。
Abstract Unmarried parents in the AHEAD study derive the majority of their longterm care hours from their children, and childcaregivers are generally unpaid. This paper examines the extent to which the division of end-of-life transfers compensates caregiving children. In a model of siblings' altruistic contribution of care to a shared parent, the parent's estate division is found to influence total family care, even where care contingencies are unenforced. Evidence in the AHEAD data that end-of-life transfers favor both current and expected caregivers, and that children make altruistic but resourceconstrained caregiving decisions, is consistent with a theory of estate division in which planned end-of-life transfers elicit care from altruistic children.