Institutional Shareholder Investment Horizons and Seasoned Equity Offerings
研究发现，短期机构股东占比越高的公司，在宣布增发新股时股价下跌越严重，且后续经营业绩更差；长期股东能更有效监督经理人，防止滥用增发资金。
Firms with more short‐term institutional shareholders experience significantly more negative abnormal returns at the announcement of seasoned equity offerings. This effect is strong for primary offerings (only firms receive proceeds), but is not present for secondary offerings (firms do not receive any proceeds). Furthermore, a shorter institutional shareholder investment horizon predicts poorer postissue abnormal operating performance and the negative effect of a shorter shareholder horizon is mitigated by higher managerial ownership. My results are consistent with the argument that long‐term shareholders more carefully monitor managerial activities and prevent misuse of the cash flow provided by equity issues.