Reordering an existing queue
研究了在等待成本未知且处理时间相同的情况下，对现有队列重新排序的机制设计问题，发现预算平衡、结果效率、策略证明性和个体理性无法同时满足，并探讨了放弃预算平衡或结果效率后的可行机制。
We consider the mechanism design problem of reordering an existing queue when waiting costs are unknown and processing times for jobs are identical. In contrast to the corresponding problem without an initial queue, budget balance (BB), outcome efficiency (OE), strategyproofness (SP), and individual rationality (IR) are incompatible. We investigate the implications of dropping BB and OE. Dropping BB yields no mechanism which never runs a budget deficit but allowing for a bound on the budget deficit yields positive results. Dropping OE yields only fixed-price trading or constant mechanisms when there are two agents but there are additional mechanisms when there are more agents. We identify a mechanism which is not a fixed-price trading mechanism and characterize its maximal level of ‘queue inefficiency’.