Optimal Voting Rules
研究了在任意数量投票人和备选方案下，激励相容且事前社会福利最大化的投票机制，发现通过修改鲍文（1943）的序贯投票方案（灵活多数门槛）可实施最优结果，并复制整个匿名、一致且占优策略激励相容的机制类别。
We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e., utilitarian) mechanism for settings with an arbitrary number of agents and alternatives where the privately informed agents have single-crossing and single-peaked preferences. The optimal outcome can be implemented by modifying a sequential voting scheme, due to Bowen (1943), and used in many legislatures and committees. The modiÖcation uses a áexible majority threshold for each of several alternatives, and allows us to replicate, via a single sequential procedure, the entire class of anonymous, unanimous and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. Our analysis relies on the elegant characterization of this class of mechanisms for single-peaked preferences by Moulin (1980) and, subsequently, for single-crossing preferences by Saporiti (2009).