ANTIDUMPING, INTRA‐INDUSTRY TRADE, AND QUALITY REVERSALS
研究两个企业生产不同质量产品时的出口博弈，发现反倾销政策可能导致本国企业成为质量领导者，但会降低全球福利。
We examine an export game where two (home and foreign) firms produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is more R&D efficient and is based in a larger and richer market. The unique (risk‐dominant) Nash equilibrium exhibits intra‐industry trade, and the foreign producer manufactures a higher‐quality product. When transport costs are low, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm arises; otherwise, reciprocal dumping occurs. For some parameters, a domestic antidumping policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the home firm becomes the quality leader. This policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases.