Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures
研究了选举激励如何影响立法者将公共资金分配给本选区的行为，发现当立法者面临任期限制时，他们带回选区的资金会减少，且选区数量多的州减少幅度较小。
We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of funding that a legislator channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit. We find that legislators bring less pork to their district when they cannot seek re-election. Consistent with the Law of 1/N, this last term reduction in funding is smaller in states with many legislative districts.