EXPLAINING GIFT-EXCHANGE-THE LIMITS OF GOOD INTENTIONS
研究了基于意图的社会偏好作为企业与工人之间礼物交换解释的局限性，发现利己与互惠玩家博弈中礼物交换不会在均衡中出现，均衡行为总是相互不友善。
This paper explores the limitations of intention-based social preferences as an explanation of gift-exchange between a firm and a worker. In a framework with one self-interested and one reciprocal player, gift-giving never arises in equilibrium. Instead, any equilibrium in a large class of multistage games must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players. Besides gift-exchange, this class of games also includes moral hazard models and the rotten kid framework. Even though equilibrium behavior may appear positively reciprocal in some of these games, the self-interested player never benefits from reciprocity. We discuss the relation of these results to the theoretical and empirical literature on gift-exchange in employment relations.