Does the Existence of a Public Good Enhance Cooperation among Users of Common-Pool Resources?
研究显示，当公共池塘资源的使用者共享并自愿贡献于某种公共品时，即使没有利他偏好或重复博弈，过度开采问题也会消失。模型通过两阶段博弈证明，使用者会追求总开采剩余最大化。
Without resorting to the folk theorem or to altruistic preferences, we demonstrate that the problem of overharvesting among individually rational harvesters in a local commons vanishes if the harvesters share, and voluntarily contribute to, some public good. Formulating the model as a two-stage sequential game, the harvesting of a renewable natural resource takes place at the first stage. The observed harvesting surplus is then used for buying private goods and contributing to public goods at the second stage. In this setting, the model shows that the harvesters share an individual objective of maximizing total harvesting surplus. <i></i>