LEARNING WITH FIXED RULES: THE MINORITY GAME
批判性地评述了少数者博弈中适应性行为的文献，该模型赋予玩家固定行为规则子集，虽非优化行为，但能产生接近均衡的聚合行为，并解释标准模型难以说明的实验现象。
Abstract This paper gives a critical account of the literature on adaptive behaviour in the minority game, a simple congestion game. The literature has proposed a model which differs markedly from many standard learning models in that players are endowed with a fixed subset of behavioural rules or response modes which map the observed history to actions. These rules need not have a behavioural interpretation or be derived from some form of optimizing behaviour. Nonetheless, this model gives rise to behaviour that is close to equilibrium behaviour at the aggregate level. The individual‐level behaviour predicted by the model seems to capture some aspects of observed experimental behaviour that are difficult to explain using standard models.