The Cascade Effect on Lending Conditions: Evidence from the Syndicated Loan Market
理论和实证研究了潜在贷款人之间的互动如何通过信息级联影响银团贷款的合同条款，发现当贷款人只能观察前任决策时，利率更高、银团失败概率更低，且关系距离与贷款利差、抵押要求正相关，与失败概率负相关。
Abstract This paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, how interactions among potential lenders may influence contract terms via informational cascade in the syndicated loan market. Our model shows that the ex‐post observed interest rate is higher and the probability of syndication failure is lower when potential lenders can only observe the decisions of their predecessors versus when they can freely communicate with each other. Empirical tests confirm the model's predictions and the existence of a cascade effect on lending conditions. Using relational distance to proxy for the segmentation of communication, we find that relational distance is positively related to the loan spread and the requirements for collateral and guarantees, but negatively related to the probability of syndication failure.