On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
研究存在私人品味冲击的交换经济中消费的有效分配动态，提出递归方法寻找激励相容且帕累托最优的可行分配，发现有效分配中不平等程度持续增加。
This paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers, each of whom is subject to private, idiosyncratic taste shocks. We propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are Pareto optimal within this set. The method is applied to several parametric examples. We find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases, with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources. We discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements.