Oblivious equilibrium for concentrated industries
针对高度集中市场，提出部分 oblivious 均衡（POE）概念，允许存在一组主导企业被所有企业持续监控。通过计算实验比较 POE、OE 与马尔可夫完美均衡（MPE）的表现，发现 POE 在高度集中市场中表现良好，并推导了无法计算 MPE 时 POE 性能的误差界。
This article explores the application of oblivious equilibrium (OE) to highly concentrated markets. We define a natural extended notion of OE, called partially oblivious equilibrium (POE), that allows for there to be a set of strategically important firms (the “dominant” firms), whose firm states are always monitored by every other firm in the market. We perform computational experiments that explore the characteristics of POE, OE, and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), and find that POE generally performs well in highly concentrated markets. We also derive error bounds for evaluating the performance of POE for cases where MPE cannot be computed.