Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps
在全球博弈中引入信号传递，研究政策在货币危机和银行挤兑等协调环境中的信息作用。外生信息不对称可选出唯一均衡，但政策干预产生的内生信息导致多重均衡，使政策制定者陷入自我实现预期决定协调结果和最优政策的陷阱。
This paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs. While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria. The policy maker is thus trapped into a position in which self-fulfilling expectations dictate not only the coordination outcome but also the optimal policy. This result does not rely on the freedom to choose out-of-equilibrium beliefs, nor on the policy being a public signal; it may obtain even if the policy is observed with idiosyncratic noise.