Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
研究了实现林达尔或瓦尔拉斯配置的机制，要求其纳什均衡在广泛自适应动态下稳定，提出收缩性作为稳定性标准，并给出充要条件，发现一维消息空间无法同时满足，而增加维度可实现动态稳定并保持预算平衡。
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on contractive mechanisms. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to Nash implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations, show that these conditions are inconsistent with the contraction property when message spaces are one-dimensional, and then show how to use additional dimensions to achieve dynamic stability while gaining budget balance out of equilibrium.