Sunk Cost and Entry-Exit Decisions under Individual Transferable Quotas: Why Industry Restructuring Is Delayed
通过传统确定性投资模型分析沉没成本和企业进入退出决策，解释了引入个体可转让配额后最优船队结构转型缓慢的原因，发现配额年租赁单价处于某一区间时长期结构无法立即实现。
<i>The paper shows that explicit modelling of sunk cost and a firm’s entry-exit decision in a traditional deterministic investment model may give an explanation of the slow transition to the optimal fleet structure following the introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). The analysis shows that the annual lease unit price of quota may be in a range where the long-run fleet structure will not be attainable at once. Over time, firms with zero gross investment as optimal behavior may leave the industry as the capital decays and over the transition period the optimal fleet structure prevails.</i>