Asymmetric Effects of Regulation FD on Management Earnings Forecasts
研究发现公平披露法规促使管理层更多利用盈利预测作为向下引导工具以达成或超越盈利预期，且这种向下引导的预测质量下降，而向上引导的预测质量提升。
ABSTRACT We document that the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on public management earnings forecasts (MFs) is asymmetric. Our results suggest that FD increased managers' use of MFs as a downward-guidance mechanism to help achieve meeting or beating earnings expectations. This effect is more pronounced when existing analyst forecasts are optimistic and when firms had selective disclosure policies pre-FD. We also find that the increased use of MFs as downward guidance leads to post-FD reductions in MF quality (accuracy and informativeness) for the downward guiding MFs that are most likely meet/beat motivated, while quality improves for upward-guiding MFs. Finally, our evidence suggests that results from prior research about FD-induced changes in information environment variables, such as analyst forecast quality and investor trading activities, depend on whether the firm issues MFs and whether those MFs are downward guiding. Data Availability: All data are available from public databases identified in the paper.